Despite that large investments have been made by the European Union in restoring and preserving heritage damaged after the Kosovo War 1998-99, there have been no previous attempts to gain more in-depth knowledge about the implementation and success of the interventions. Organisations involved in funding and facilitating architectural interventions in post-conflict zones may have differing aims and agendas that influence selection and methods, and ultimately the results. This paper aims to shed light on a pioneering project carried out on damaged kullas, massive masonry towers connected to farmsteads, in Kosovo 2001-02. Kullas were systematically attacked and burned during the conflict. The methodology is based on interviews with involved people and on documentation that is publically available, since it is crucial to uncover the aims and agendas of involved actors if one wishes to understand how and why decisions were made. In the end, what was deemed most important in the process was not the reconstruction in itself, but rather the development of craftsmen's skills and the need to create a dialogue on the values of Kosovo heritage. The paper shows how the reconstruction of built heritage can facilitate processes of dialogue in conflict areas.
Introduction
Destruction of cultural heritage often belongs to the more visible effects of war. 1 As a result, the reconstruction of heritage sites after conflict becomes part of political processes shaping post-conflict communities, contributing to confirming or creating new identities. Despite that large investments have been made by the European Union in restoring and preserving heritage damaged both during and after the Kosovo War 1998-99, there is surprisingly little knowledge of how decisions were made before and during interventions. There is still a general lack of knowledge on the wider implications of architectural interventions in conflict areas. 2 Organisations involved in funding and facilitating architectural interventions in post-conflict zones may have differing aims and agendas that ultimately affect results.
I argue that a cultural process of heritage 3 began in Kosovo after the end of the 78-day war in 1999. To look at reconstruction as a heritage process reinforces the notion that heritage is not just the management and conservation of resources, but rather the active 'construction and negotiation of meaning through remembering'. 4 The process was governed by international actors with the aim of creating a new Kosovar identity resting on a vision of shared and peaceful heritage. Integral to this process has been a dominating call for 'reconstruction of an imagined past' 5 that unfortunately has contributed to the conservation of inequalities and injustices in Kosovar society. 6 In Kosovo heritagisation has not just meant a safe-guarding of heritage assets, but actually an active process of identity building based on the notion that it is crucial 'to restore relations as before the conflict'. 7 This is a problematic notion since it, in the words of Kisić, often sees 'heritage and identities as static and does not ignite dialogues around heritage'. 8 Reconstruction efforts, if carried out properly, should encourage dialogue about the past and the values of heritage, and not work as a damper on discourse.
This paper aims to shed light on a pioneering project carried out on damaged kullas, massive stone towers connected to farmsteads, in Kosovo 2001-02 with funding from the EU and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). It is based on interviews with persons who were involved in the project, and on archival sources that are publically available.
The Kosovo War and its aftermath
Architectural heritage was at the centre of the Kosovo conflict of the late 1990s. The Kosovo situation was created by the the way the territory became the symbolic centerpiece in Serb nationalist claims. The properties of the Serbian Orthodox church were used to sanction Serb supremacy of the province, while Kosovo Albanian heritage was deliberately mismanaged and finally targeted in the war. 9 More than 500 of the existing 700 kullas were vandalised, many of them looted and torched because Serb militia perceived them as symbols of Albanian heritage. 10 In Serb history there is a long tradition of torching the enemy's houses, according to Tim Judah who has written an exhaustive history of the Serb people. 11 The overarching goal of the Serb aggression in Kosovo was ethnic cleansing on a massive scale. 12 Houses were looted and burnt especially in the western parts in and around Gjakovë/Đakovica, close to the Albanian border where resistance from the Albanian guerilla was more fierce than in other parts of Kosovo.
After an invasion by NATO in 1999 Kosovo came under the governance of the United Nations. An interim civil administration, UNMIK (UN Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo), was put in place 'to eliminate ethnic hatred, and to attempt reconciliation, reconstruction and political planning'. 13 As a consequence of the Serb mismanagement of Kosovo, the war and the chaos it led to, there was a number of structural problems in preserving heritage in Kosovo after 1999. To begin with, there was the unresolved conflict between Kosovo and Serbia surrounding the interpretation of the area's historical origins and the responsibility of preserving heritage sites. Institutions were understaffed and there was little funding for heritage conservation. The level of professionalism was very low due to the flight of Serbian government officials, the politicised educational system and the patriarchal structure of Kosovar society. There was also great poverty due to the fact that unemployment rates were very high. On top of these factors there was also continual destruction of the built environment due to ignorance and the absence of functioning institutions and laws.
The figures of how much of the building stock was damaged vary because different methods were used by organisations (European Agency of Reconstruction, EAR, being one of them) that estimated damage immediately after the NATO bombing. It has been estimated that between 50% and 70% of the total stock was in need of reconstruction. The EU immediately took on an important role in reconstructing Kosovo, partly through EAR (in function 2000-08), in order to make it possible for refugees who had fled to neighbouring countries to return. EAR contributed to the huge Kosovo Housing Reconstruction Programme that was launched immediately after the war in order first to provide shelter for returning refugees, and secondly to begin repairing houses and building new ones.
14 Kullas were just a small part of the houses damaged, but were considered important for their value as heritage from the Ottoman period, before Serbs came to dominate the area.
When Kosovo was taken over by the UNMIK administration, the existing (Serbian) legislation on cultural heritage was abolished. New institutions began to be developed, but this proved to be a very slow-moving process that still today has not reached satisfactory results. In 2006 a new heritage law was introduced by the parliament. Except for the lack of a functioning law prior to 2006, there were also poorly developed institutions working to protect cultural heritage, and they did not cooperate with the planning departments of the municipalities. 15 The continuous destruction of historical values convinced EAR of the need of a project that could show EU and Kosovo that EAR was not contributing to the destruction of heritage while rebuilding the country. This is the most important reason why EAR decided to fund the Kulla project.
Methodological approach
The reconstruction of heritage after conflicts can be said to follow a system of values that donors wish to support and reproduce. Sites rebuilt are often thought to reflect these values and to pose as markers in the landscape reminding viewers of the donor's values. This is part of the heritagisation process. The power to manifest such values is at the same time an expression of power since it takes resources (capital, knowledge and skills, human labour, materials) to rebuild the environment. 16 The Kulla project (2001-02) has been studied with the purpose of uncovering the values, agendas and decision-making of international actors. The paper is based on five interviews with key persons involved in work in Kosovo and archive materials mainly produced and collected by Cultural Heritage without Borders (CHwB), a non-profit organisation founded in Stockholm in 1995. CHwB was given the task to manage the Kulla project from the beginning to its end.
All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. Written sources used here mainly consist of communications, applications, reports, correspondence but also plans collected and partly produced by CHwB. The lion part of the documents are written in Swedish and the rest in English. This documentation is made available to the public through ATA, the archive of the Swedish National Heritage Board. Anyone visiting the archive can study these documents. Finally the author has visited reconstructed kullas in western Kosovo to study how interventions were carried out and how they are used today.
The Kulla project
The selection process
In 2000 CHwB was invited to Kosovo to discuss how it could contribute to a positive development. Kosovo was administered by UNMIK and law was upheld by NATO troops. The UNMIK Department of Culture, Youth and Sports (DoC) was carrying out documentation of the damages inflicted on heritage sites in Kosovo together with the Institute for the Protection of Monuments (IPM), a state agency responsible for overseeing Kosovo heritage. A huge inventory had been collected by the time EAR became involved in heritage reconstruction. From this inventory five kullas were selected for reconstruction by the agency. 17 In fact, the buildings were in various degrees of decay and for different reasons. They had not all been damaged in the war but had also suffered from long term neglect and insensitive renovation. Two of them, located in the villages Deçan/Dečani and Junik, had burned in the war, one in Isniq had damage from shelling, one (in Pejë/Peć) had been heavily renovated, and another one in Isniq had been in disrepair for a long time. This last one ( Figure 1 ) was actually the worst damaged house out of the five. However, the Deçan/Dečani kulla proved to be the most complicated case. Due to a dispute about the property boundaries, it finally became necessary to take down the whole building stone by stone and reassemble it seven meters away from the original location.
18 These kullas were selected on the grounds that they were located in parts of Kosovo that had been struck hardest in the war, and because it was easier to work in western Kosovo than in the east where there were more conflicts between the Serb and Kosovo Albanian population.
19

Conflicting values
The goal of EAR with the project was officially to help 'preserve and promote Kosovo's cultural and architectural heritage'. 20 As opposed to mosques and madras, Kullas were interpreted as a secular heritage that UNMIK hoped would shape a post-war Kosovar identity uniting the ethnic groups and contributing to reconciliation. 21 The selected buildings were from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and located in the vicinity of Pejë/ Peć in western Kosovo. At the same time EAR attempted to initiate the restoration of a Serbian Orthodox monastery in order to accommodate Serb interests. 22 There was a set of instrumental values guiding EAR involvement in the project. These values were partly directed towards the conservation of the buildings and the heritage they represented. At least as important were the prospect of reusing kulla for residential purposes and to save building materials. 23 EAR did not want to get involved in discussions of guilt or specific causes of war damage to heritage. The overall aim was to promote reconciliation between groups that were defined along ethnic lines. 24 For that reason it was crucial for EAR to be viewed by the ethnic groups as a neutral and benevolent actor.
CHwB was invited by EAR to implement the project after the agency had made the selection. 25 When DoC eventually heard about the proposal it expressed its scepticism towards engaging in reconstruction. Instead of this project the department asked for expert advise on how to create a proper institutional framework for heritage management in Kosovo. For that reason Sweden sent one person, a museum official, to co-head the new IPM together with a Kosovar co-head. In order not to create unnecessary tension CHwB was eager to find support from DoC in the selection of objects to work with, but EAR does not seem to have been as interested in having discussions directly with the department. The reason for this was that EAR did not believe IPM could use the funds according to the norms of EU. IPM was perceived as an incompetent and corrupt institution. 27 EAR trusted instead CHwB to administer funds and lead work on the kullas. Architects appointed by IPM (but without experience from conservation work) would work on the kullas, but the project leader would supervise them and have the last say. This uneven power relation would cause a conflict between the head of IPM and CHwB that would have repercussions throughout the project. 28 The inclusion of ten students from the Faculty of Architecture at the University of Pristina to do measures in order to get experience from conservation work on buildings seems to have deepened this conflict. 29 CHwB engagement with cultural heritage was known from BiH since 1995. The NGO had a strong reputation for carrying out projects at a low cost and with a high degree of authenticity. In a letter to the CHwB board regarding the decision to begin working in Kosovo the chair explained:
we have gained quite a good reputation in Bosnia, because we work in a flexible way with local Institutes, and because we insist on the best restoration methods and results. One of our main goals is an educational one: the transfer of competence. 30 EAR cherished another aim, namely to assist in the housing construction programme. Capacity building was at very best considered a secondary goal. It had very strict requirements on how its funds were to be used, including a tight schedule. How would CHwB be able to reach its educational goal when EAR wished to finish the project as quickly as possible?
Issues of funding EAR compared reconstruction with new construction, and would not allow any additional costs that conservation work normally required. There was little understanding for the demand for documentation and discussion about suitable measures. EAR badly wanted the project to finish so that the organisation could use the kullas for promotional activities in Kosovo. 31 The donor perceived CHwB as just another developer that would be able to cover 80% of all costs and then demand reimbursement at the end of the project. In June 2001 it seemed as if CHwB had to decline the proposal to work on kullas, since EAR demanded that CHwB pay 20% of all costs for the reconstruction before receiving reimbursement. 32 In a heated correspondence the chair explained this was impossible since CHwB was just a small NGO without any capital of its own. CHwB decided to approach SIDA with a request for additional funding. SIDA did so, because just like in Bosnia the Serbs' tactics aimed among other things at destroying people's cultural heritage. In order to be able to feel that the roots are left in the native place and to reinstate the feeling of identity and belonging it is important that culturally valuable buildings, as well as archives and museums, which are strongly associated with the history of people, also are restored after the war. 33 The value system of the Swedish donor becomes visible in the quote above. Interventions on kullas would hopefully strengthen the identity of Kosovars and also make themselves more interested in taking responsibility for 'their' own heritage. SIDA, on the contrary to EAR, did not hesitate to discuss questions of blame in its decision. As will become evident, this would cause a conflict in the communication between CHwB and EAR.
Principles of reconstruction
There was some discussion between the CHwB board and the project leader regarding the aims. The discussion concerned whether the result of the restoration was the most important aim, or if it was the actual process. 34 The CHwB board wished to have a reconstruction, or possibly even restoration, carried out according to the ideology of the Swedish architect Ove Hidemark (1931 Hidemark ( -2015 . Hidemark became an influential architect within restoration practice in Sweden from the 1970s, when he led the restoration of the Skokloster palace north of Stockholm. Hidemark's approach to restoration can be described in brief as pragmatic, contextual and holistic, with an emphasis on the choice of materials and their attributes:
The ageing processes of materia become the key to our experience of time, an experience that also must be safeguarded in maintenance and repair. … The replacement of material demands reconstruction with the same material. … Restoration is never historical cosmetics in face of the superficially presentable, but an issue of recognising integrity, that is ageing of the stature, the skeleton, as well as skin and muscle. This is basically a demand for an ethics of materials or an ecology of materials. 35 CHwB would go to great lengths to implement this notion of respecting the materials, often in opposition to the Kosovar architects, but also in opposition to EAR who found it an expensive and excessively time consuming way of reconstructing buildings. Hidemark's method demanded minute documentation of the building history and great care in selecting local and authentic materials. It also demanded traditional craftsmen's skills in order to be used correctly, most importantly stone cutting, carpentry and work with mortar. Following Hidemark's method meant giving the architect a secondary role in relation to the craftsman, whose practical knowledge on how to work with materials became a key to a successful restoration. The architects involved in the Kulla project did not have any knowledge of these traditional skills. Instead local craftsmen had to be sought after and recruited to the project. Hidemark's method also meant that detailed surveys of the buildings needed to be conducted, since important documentation had been lost before the war as Serb authorities had moved it from Kosovo to Belgrad.
Ove Hidemark recognised and distinguished between three kinds of intervention: conservation, repairs and additions, and reconstruction. He said that reconstruction should not be employed often, but that it sometimes could be regarded a legitimate intervention. A building might have been falsified and have decayed into a state of complete disrepair, but without having lost its value as an important piece of heritage. Reconstruction put an even higher demand on the skill of the architect than the first two kinds of intervention. The reason, according to Hidemark, was that the architect was given the role of a storyteller and had to consider what idea of authenticity he or she wished to build on. Consequently, the authenticity of building technique and materials was given a crucial role.
According to this partially new restoration tradition established in Sweden in the 1970s, the architect became responsible for staying true to history, not lapsing into falsification or beautification of the past when carrying out reconstructions. Hidemark was pragmatic and in his publications he never became very clear about exactly how the architect would 'stay true to history'. Compared to conservation and repairs, then, reconstruction was more prone to generate controversy precisely because of the liberties (or responsibilities) that were given to the architect. And this is also what happened in the Kulla project, in which the Swedish architect constantly had to argue with the Kosovar architects who had been trained at Yugoslavian schools without receiving any specialisation in restoration.
EAR had appointed four local architects to work with the kullas under the management of CHwB. One of them represented IPM, two came from the Faculty of Architecture at the University of Pristina, and one was independent. 36 Especially one of the architects wished to use modern materials and methods to restore one kulla, contrary not only to Hidemark's idea but also to international charters. The project leader felt he needed to limit disagreements between him and the Kosovar architects. To the CHwB board he explained it to be important to make the architects proud of their own accomplishments, that is to speak to their egos instead of causing conflict over restoration principles that were alien to them. 37 He did not wish to be remembered as a foreign intruder who just wanted to have it his way and who did not listen to his co-workers. Emphasis was on the project as process rather then on achieving a perfect reconstruction.
Reinventing the past?
In his work on the reconstruction of heritage Stanley-Price excludes buildings destroyed in wars or natural disasters when discussing the principles of reconstruction. 38 The reason is that buildings destroyed in our own time may have been adequately documented so that they can be restored instead of reconstructed. This was not the fact in the Kosovo War (and it should also be a problem in many other conflict areas), after which a lot of plans and documentation of heritage were either missing or had previously been removed to Serbian territory. 39 New documentation thus had to be produced, and that was time consuming, difficult and expensive.
In August 2001 concern was growing in the EAR that documentation of the buildings was taking too much time, and that some of the architects involved were not aware of international conservation principles. 40 Over time the conflict between CHwB restoration ideology and the Kosovar architects' view deepened. According to the latter there was no reason to use the traditional materials and methods endorsed by the 'Swedish model' with support from international charters on conservation. It seems that the project leader deliberately provoked the students by showing that there was a 'value gap' between him and the other architects. He wished to start a debate on conservation in Kosovo in order to make the young generation aware of their heritage and the need for conservation specialists in the country. Needless to say, this was not part of the agenda of EAR, not to begin with at least, and definitely not of IPM that was supposed to be an authority in conservation issues.
After some initial problems with trust the relationship between the students and the project leader improved because especially one of them, who came from the area and had good local connections, could acquire materials and recruit craftsmen who were able in stone cutting and working with lime and wood. 41 These young students became aligned with CHwB but were also increasingly viewed as a threat by the established architects, who feared that they would become professionally marginalised. As a consequence the relation between the project leader and the authorities worsened, but his relation to the students involved became stronger.
In practice there was little in terms of authenticity that was bargained with. A few features were compromised. One of them was the size of windows on one of the towers; a second was the interior embellishment of one of the kullas. The architects involved were keen to use cement, but this was argued against by the project leader who wished to see traditional and local materials used, much in line with Hidemark's ideas and with international charters. 42 Locally produced materials (chestnut wood, lime and stones from river beds) were used by craftsmen from the area.
One issue of reuse was the size of window openings which are very small in kullas. This attribute makes the rooms dark. Property owners wished to enlarge window openings in order to let more light into the rooms. 43 In one of the cases 'a few' new windows were opened in two facades on one of the buildings. 44 This would make the buildings more attractive and make them easier to use. But enlargened openings would also completely change the appearance of these buildings, and risk giving a false understanding of their historical uses as defensive structures.
By January 2002 the initial skepticism of the EAR had vanished, or so it seemed for the moment. The organisation began stressing the importance of not just completing the five kullas but also raising the level of competence in Kosovo with regards to building conservation. 45 It seems EAR listened to CHwB in this matter. At the same time the CHwB chair was becoming increasingly concerned for the costs and asked the project leader to cut his expenditures drastically. Unforeseen challenges had made the costs much higher than expected. It was not just the damages of the buildings that constituted a problem. A number of other factors made the Kulla project complicated and more time consuming than anticipated. Among these were issues of ownership, new construction, conflicts between co-workers, high prices on materials, a willingness of local architects to 'invent' history where it could not be documented, and requirements to finish the project quickly. 46 In a letter to EAR the project leader stressed the responsibility to procure for the building of local competence, and not just finishing building projects on time:
As what I can understand the EU will be more and more responsible for creating a local Kosovar culture administration. This will only function if you have trust in the local staff and at the same time help them as much as possible to reach the objectives that we have agreed on together. 47 
Conflicting images of the project
Not even at the very end did CHwB and EAR agree on how to correctly interpret the values of the project. There was one public image of the project as very successful, and there was another one described internally in heated correspondence in this struggle between David and Goliat. In one case differences in the agendas became very clear, and that was in a brochure published by CHwB late in 2002. A passage in which the Kulla project was described, and the reaction from EAR that the description caused, revealed that the two organisations ultimately did not comprehend the goals of the project in the same way:
During the spring of 2001 the EU's European Agency of Reconstruction turned to the Foundation with a request whether or not it would for the sum of 500,000 euros be willing to take on the reconstruction of five bombed-out and badly destroyed Albanian Kulla-buildings in the south west of Kosovo. Despite long drawn-out and complicated negotiations, CHwB managed to sign a contract that seemed to suit a non-profit organisation and offered reasonable financial conditions, although a supplementary grant from Sida was needed. … Because of their [the kullas] very characteristic style of building they were subjected to systematic destruction from the Serbian milita as the ethnic conflict escalated. 48 On one page (Figure 1 ) there were illustrations of one the Kullas during reconstruction that easily could be misunderstood. The Kulla had not been damaged in the war, but a whole corner of the tower had to be disassembled and then built up again from the ground. 49 An EAR official, following EAR's 'neutralist' approach to the conflict, meant that the destruction of Serb and Roma homes after June 1999 also should have been mentioned in order to give a more nuanced and full picture of the conflict. Clearly, CHwB was more prone to take the side of the Kosovo Albanians, whereas EAR strived to avoid discussion about guilt.
The official was also displeased by the focus on the SIDA contribution, and demanded that the publication be withdrawn immediately. The response from the EU authority shows the importance of improving its public image in the EU and Kosovo, and that the Kulla project was given exactly this role. EAR wanted to show that it took responsibility for the heritage of Kosovo by acting efficiently, providing the necessary funding and avoiding conflicts. This last aim was reached by not discussing guilt or causes of the conflict, and by attempting to balance interventions on 'Albanian' heritage with projects involving 'Serb' heritage, thereby contributing to heritagisation in Kosovo.
For its own part, CHwB was eager to demonstrate its intimate alliance with SIDA in order to secure future funding for new projects in Kosovo, so that CHwB would be able to establish a permanent affiliation. 50 The NGO also wanted to show that it could overcome the obstacles of bureaucracy in order to fulfill its own goals of building peace and strengthening civil society through restoration, education and communication.
Publically both EAR and CHwB acknowledged the success of the Kulla project. Interviews and the use of archival materials have made it possible to reach a more nuanced understanding of the reconstruction process. There was constant bickering about the objectives of the project. Finally there was also disagreement about how to describe the past conflict and its outcomes. EAR wanted to be acknowledged as a powerful and benevolent actor in Kosovo, while CHwB wished to have recognition for its flexibility and ability to carry out projects with great success and to a low cost, despite challenges.
Heritage as process, and not just as material
This paper has exposed the values of donors (EAR, SIDA) and a facilitating NGO (CHwB) intervening in heritage reconstruction after the Kosovo War. It has become clear that organisations involved in interventions may very well have differing values, understandings of the conflict and agendas even within one single project. By resisting the EAR requirements of just reconstructing the kullas in as short time as possible and instead focusing on creating dialogue and giving local craftsmen and architects the opportunity to work with conservation, CHwB aimed at capturing a multitude of values. The strategy proved to be of importance for the continued work of the NGO in the region, and also received praise for its success.
Could the project have developed in other directions? Yes, without doubt. If CHwB had successfully argued for more time and if the NGO had not applied for additional funding from SIDA, the project would have ended with 'just' a few more reconstructed buildings. Instead it turned into a pioneering work showing what could actually be achieved within the heritage field in Kosovo when skilled architects cooperated with craftsmen. The project seems to have attracted a lot of media attention because it was a piece of good news in a time when most news were bad.
Despite that the case studied here occurred some years ago, the problems facing heritage regeneration and reconstruction are largely the same today. Heritage regeneration in South-Eastern Europe still suffers from lack of skills in management, technical expertise and resource allocation, but also from failure in making local communities feel committed to their heritage. 51 Not just the competence selected -both expertise sent from other countries and staff recruited locally -but also the inclusion of the community is of crucial importance for the success of any reconstruction project.
A processual view of heritage eventually won out against the view of looking at heritage as a stock of buildings that should be made to suit instrumental needs. When viewing heritage as a process the agenda was populated by the issues of local participation, training and dialogue. It paved the way for new projects and made the establishment of a local Kosovo affiliation of CHwB possible. Several Kosovar participants of the project were employed. Within CHwB they were allowed to develop their skills gradually and let their self confidence grow. The NGO came to play an important role in the Ljubjana Process, and continues to work in Kosovo today.
